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Proceedings of the Annual Acquisition Research Program 
The following article is taken as an excerpt from the proceedings of the annual 
Acquisition Research Program.  This annual event showcases the research projects 
funded through the Acquisition Research Program at the Graduate School of Business 
and Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School.  Featuring keynote speakers, 
plenary panels, multiple panel sessions, a student research poster show and social 
events, the Annual Acquisition Research Symposium offers a candid environment 
where high-ranking Department of Defense (DoD) officials, industry officials, 
accomplished faculty and military students are encouraged to collaborate on finding 
applicable solutions to the challenges facing acquisition policies and processes within 
the DoD today.  By jointly and publicly questioning the norms of industry and academia, 
the resulting research benefits from myriad perspectives and collaborations which can 
identify better solutions and practices in acquisition, contract, financial, logistics and 
program management. 
For further information regarding the Acquisition Research Program, electronic 
copies of additional research, or to learn more about becoming a sponsor, please visit 
our program website at: 
www.acquistionresearch.org  
For further information on or to register for the next Acquisition Research 
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The panel discussion will address four critical defence acquisition issues and 
programmes which illustrate the innovative approaches the United Kingdom is undertaking 
in this area. All four cases will echo the challenges facing the US and other countries and 
provide valuable "lessons learned" in a number of key areas. The first topic is the UK 
decision to acquire C-17 transports, which provides a good example of the benefits of 
capability management. The second topic is the UK implementation of a defence industrial 
strategy which demonstrates a concerted effort to identify those national defence 
capabilities that must be maintained, and those more efficiently addressed by foreign 
acquisition and/or cooperation. The third topic is the UK assessment of European defence 
cooperation, including the difficulties with such efforts and the impact of the controversial 
"re-evaluation" of the contract for the next generation of aerial tankers. The final topic is the 
UK experience with the Joint Strike Fighter program, in which the UK is the largest non-US 
participant, and which holds major implications on future military cooperation with the US 
Ultimately, the UK experiences show the benefits of more research on international efforts to 
identify best practices in acquisition management. 
“You never want a serious crisis to go to waste. Things that we had postponed for 
too long, that were long-term, are now immediate and must be dealt with. This crisis 
provides the opportunity for us to do things that you could not do before.”  
 White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel (Capital Journal, 2008). 
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While the military procurement challenges facing the United States are enormous, it 
is important to bear in mind that the United Kingdom and other US friends and Allies are 
also confronting the task of pursuing critical acquisition programs at a time of exceptionally 
tight defence budgets. Although in monetary terms, the task for Washington is of greater 
magnitude, the decisions that are facing London and other capitals are of equal significance 
on a national basis. However, it is clear that the impact of Department of Defense (DoD) 
decisions will reverberate in defence ministries around the world, while the converse is not 
necessarily the case.  
It remains beneficial for Allies to compare notes on valuable "lessons learned" from 
their individual acquisition experiences. There have been recommendations for change from 
domestic think-tanks and policy experts as well as from within the military. With resources 
dwindling, it arguably would be best to draw upon initiatives based on practice (and not just 
theory), and the best data to analyse would be the practice of other defence forces. If 
“business as usual” is no longer affordable, then it is useful to assess the practices of other 
defence forces to see what has worked elsewhere, provided more efficient management, 
and increased value for money.  
There are innovative initiatives which have been undertaken by the UK in the area of 
defence acquisition in recent years, some of which warrant attention and consideration by 
other defence forces. UK participation in some of the most current key defence equipment 
programs provides lessons and insights that may be valuable to other states, particularly 
regarding the future of multinational defence programs.  
Four critical areas and examples of UK defence acquisition are highlighted in this 
paper. First, the area of efficient capability management is examined, as demonstrated by 
the UK decision to acquire Boeing C-17s. Second, the example of UK defence industrial 
strategy is reviewed, indicating how it has moved the focus from a haphazard attempt to 
preserve as many jobs as possible to a serious assessment of which domestic military 
capabilities are essential for the nation. Third, the UK assessment of the general area of 
European defence cooperation practice is analysed, including commentary on the negative 
impact of the controversial "re-evaluation" under Congressional pressure of the US Air Force 
decision awarding Northrup Grumman/EADS the contract to meet future US aerial tanker 
requirements. Finally, the example of the UK experience with the Joint Strike Fighter 
program, particularly in the area of technology transfer, is assessed with a focus on 
implications on future multinational military cooperation led by the US. 
In his outline of the eight steps needed for successfully transforming an organisation, 
John Kotter (1995) stresses that the first step is establishing a sense of urgency. In the UK 
Ministry of Defence (MOD), and probably in most defence establishments, that requirement 
has presumably been met. What is now important is determining what type of change is 
required. Assessing the experience of other defence establishments is useful in making 
better informed decisions, and the UK has taken innovative approaches to address 
acquisition challenges that warrant consideration and analysis.  
Examining UK policy with an eye to possible use in the US is not a new exercise. In 
a recent report to Congress, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) (2008, December) 
review on the DoD use of performance-based logistics included an extensive examination of 
the UK MOD's experience with performance-based contracting. Similarly, John Schank 
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(2006) testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee about the RAND evaluation of the 
trends in the UK Naval Shipbuilding Industrial base, recommendations to the UK, and the 
lessons for the US industrial base.  
There is no question that the UK still faces room for improvement in the area of 
defence acquisition, as has been emphasised by commentators like Bill Kincaid (2008). The 
MOD Major Projects Report from the UK National Audit Office (NAO) (2008a, p. 5) indicates 
that for the 20 largest MOD projects (with a combined estimated cost of £28 billion1), the 
estimated total cost of the projects increased during the 12-month reporting period by £205 
million, and there was an additional total slippage in the programs of 96 months. The 
projected total increase in costs for these 20 programs compared with the budgeted cost 
indicates an increase of 12%, or some £3 billion and an aggregate delay for the programs of 
483 months, 36% over the anticipated timetable at the time the project was approved (NAO, 
2008a, p. 5).  
However, the UK MOD has made a conscious effort to pursue innovative 
management processes and increase flexibility. There is also a willingness to seek out 
outside assessments and new approaches. It is notable that the MOD has frequently 
commissioned RAND to provide an outside perspective on projects ranging from the Type 
45 destroyer (Birkler, Schank, Arena, Smith & Lee, 2002) to the UK nuclear submarine 
industrial base (RAND, 2005).  
In a time of scarce resources, it is arguably important for defence establishments to 
seek out such different perspectives and compare national policies, practices and 
accomplishments. The common theme which runs through the four UK examples that follow 
is the value of pursuing innovative and flexible approaches to defence acquisition, which can 
arise from analysing the best practices of other defence forces. The UK has worked hard to 
try and pursue such an approach and be an exemplar of innovation. Its efforts, as well as 
those of other defence establishments, warrant greater research to address the challenges 
of defence acquisition.  
Air Transport 
All the indications to date are that the UK decision in 2000 to obtain Boeing C-17 
transports was a very sound decision, not only because it was cost-effective, but it also met 
the critical requirements of the UK military. The House of Commons Defence Committee 
(2007, July 5) assessment was that:  
The leasing of four C-17 large transport aircraft, which are to be purchased when the 
lease ends, has greatly increased the MOD's strategic airlift capability and performed 
extremely well. We welcome the fact that these four aircraft will be purchased once 
the lease ends and that the MOD is to purchase a fifth C-17 aircraft. (paragraph 62)    
In its response to the Committee report, the MOD (2007, October 12) echoed the 
view that the C-17 "has proved a great success on operations" (paragraph 12) and noted its 
announcement that it would purchase a sixth C-17 as part of its effort to enhance 
operational effectiveness. The acquisition of the C-17s (along with the earlier acquisition of 
                                                
1 On April 3, 2009, 1 UK pound sterling equalled 1.46 US dollars. 
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25 C-130Js) has more than met MOD requirements, despite their having intensified with 
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. While the C-17s originally were intended to provide 
strategic lift capability, their operational use in those two countries has been essential to UK 
forces.  
The benefits of the C-17 decision have been amplified by the fact that the European 
A400M transport, launched in 1982, has still to commence flight testing. The House of 
Commons Defence Committee (2009) noted that once the MOD has a better fix on the 
extent of the delays in the A400M, it must decide whether "abandonment would be 
preferable, and to take timely decisions either to procure or lease other airlift assets so that 
a capability gap in air transport does not develop" (p. 3). Secretary of State for Defence 
Hutton stated in March 2009 that the government would make a decision with regard to 
continuing with the A400M in the beginning of July, adding that the UK "will not be content 
with a gap in capability" (Hollinger & Pfeifer, 2009).  
To provide some background: In 1994, the UK announced that it would replace its 
aging C-130K Hercules fleet. Those 50 transports had been in the Royal Air Force (RAF) 
inventory since the 1960s. The MOD decided on a two-part replacement program (NAO, 
2008b, p. 8). The first stage was replacement of 25 C-130Ks with 25 C-130Js from 
Lockheed Martin, which are an updated version of the Hercules. The second stage would be 
participation in the A400M program which would replace the other C-130Ks. Approval for 
participation in the A400M was achieved in 1997. 
The C-130Js came into the UK inventory in 1998 and were fully operational by 2001. 
As the A400M timescales became increasingly questionable, the MOD recognised that it 
would need to find an alternate solution to meet immediate requirements. There was 
concern in the UK that the purchase of the C-17s would destabilise the A400M project, 
which provided opportunities for British industry, particularly in the areas of wings and 
engines. After extensive evaluation, Secretary of State for Defence Hoon announced on 16 
May 2000 the decision to lease four C-17s.  
It is important to note that the C-17s have handled a wide variety of missions that 
would have required a diverse and much larger fleet of transports. The C-17 has been a 
solid contribution to the RAF fleet and has clearly met UK capability requirements. With 
further delays to A400M accrued and with extensive C-17 operating experience, the UK has 
now decided that an outright purchase of the leased aircraft is now a more cost-effective 
option and has expanded the fleet to reflect the operational demands.  
The C-17 decision and implementation are noteworthy for a number of reasons, 
particularly in view of the timeframe in which the decisions were taken. At the time transport 
options were being considered, Smart Procurement was still relatively new. To acquire these 
new capabilities, Smart Procurement had been introduced with the mantra of "cheaper, 
faster and better." Smart Procurement adopted a more streamlined approach to acquiring 
equipment capability by reducing the number of approval decision points (to Initial Gate and 
Main Gate) aligned to the new CADMID (Concept, Assessment, Development, Manufacture, 
In-Service and Disposal) procurement cycle. Smart Procurement was subsequently 
renamed Smart Acquisition, reflecting the wider scope of activities needed to deliver 
effective defence equipment capability. Guidance on an incremental approach to acquiring 
systems was also introduced with the process being managed by Integrated Project Teams 
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At this time, the IPTs were also in the early stages of viewing decisions through the 
optic of best commercial practice. The MOD's Defence Procurement Agency had maintained 
its traditional focus on requirements, rather than capabilities, and was in the early phases of 
moving to a concentration on the latter. Despite that fact, the transport decision centred on 
capability requirements, resulting in acquisition of an air transport capability greater than 
sought which ultimately remained within budget. It is critical to note that although a strategic 
airlift capability was originally required, the C-17 also had a tactical capability that has 
subsequently been utilised and is reflected in the UK’s follow-on purchase on a further 
aircraft. 
The UK is working assiduously to implement Through Life Capabilities Management 
(TLCM). One key structural component is a change in process. TLCM takes a programme 
approach to delivering capability, with a single Capability Manager (the Programme 
Manager) having responsibility for all Strategic Mobility capability through life, including 
C130J/K, C-17 and A400M, focusing not on specific projects or equipment, but on the 
capabilities that need to be delivered. The Capability Manager, supported by a wide team 
across all the Defence Lines of Development (Infrastructure, Personnel, Equipment, 
Organisation, Doctrine, Training, Logistics and Information), is now in a better position to 
judge the trade-offs required to provide effective capability to the front line. This step change 
has been supported by a huge effort to embed a change of culture in the MOD, which takes 
an integrated view of acquiring capability, breaking down the traditional single-service stove-
pipes.  
While European defence cooperation is addressed later, it is useful to briefly review 
UK views regarding the A400M. France and Germany have decided to stay with the A400M 
as they believe it is imperative to establish a European airlift capability. However, in view of 
continued program difficulties and delays, it is arguable that the A400M may carry too high a 
price for London to pay just to establish the UK’s European credentials. It is also important 
to note that BAE Systems has divested itself of its stake in Airbus, leaving no significant UK 
industrial investment (though there are UK participating firms) in the A400M project.  
Europe has moved forward with efforts to promote defence cooperation, including 
the A400M. The organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation (OCCAR) was created in 
1998 to facilitate and manage European cooperative armament programs. It is noteworthy 
that NATO (2009) and OCCAR signed an agreement on security of information on 5 
February 2009 which protects classified NATO data given to OCCAR to meet NATO 
requirements and conformity with NATO standardisation agreements. This is critical as 
NATO participates in three projects managed by OCCAR: the COBRA Target Locating 
Radar, the TIGER helicopter, and the A400M.  
But while the OCCAR Business Plan (2008, p. 5) indicates a staff of over 200 and a 
budget of some four billion Euros, its efforts to tighten performance targets have not had a 
major impact on the programs it manages. To return to the A400M, the transport 
requirement was announced in 1997 by eight European nations, the decision of the Airbus 
A400M was made in 2000, the decision on the engine was made in 2003, OCCAR (2008, p. 
11) lists the total program cost as 20.3 billion Euros—and the plane has yet to have its 
inaugural flight. The UK has reduced its original pledge to purchase 45 A400Ms down to 25, 
and there remains speculation it may be considering reducing the number even further. 
The UK showed great flexibility and innovation in addressing its air transport 
requirements. The key “lesson learned” from the C-17 experience is that the UK made a 
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decision focussed on capabilities. The US, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand have 
adopted a capabilities-driven acquisition process. Whatever the shortfalls in implementation, 
it is worthwhile for defence establishments to seriously consider and analyse the benefits of 
a capabilities-driven approach. The UK’s air transport decision is a good example of the 
results when the focus is not on equipment, but on capabilities. 
Defence Industrial Strategy 
The political imperative to protect domestic jobs and industries is always present and 
intensifies during hard times. When coupled with the legitimate concern about retaining key 
indigenous defence capabilities, protectionism in the defence industrial area is a powerful 
force. The fact that this political, economic and security priority is often at odds with the 
acquisition of the best military capabilities at the best price is an eternal problem. As all 
military forces seek to grapple with these difficult decisions, it is worth considering the 
approach taken by the UK in generating an innovative and extensive Defence Industrial 
Strategy (DIS) (MOD, 2005), released as a follow-on to the wider Defence Industrial Policy 
published in 2002. 
The DIS concisely notes that the strategy carefully considers: 
which industrial capabilities we need to retain in the UK to ensure that we can 
continue to operate our equipment in the way we choose to maintain appropriate 
sovereignty and thereby protect our national security. The Strategy sets these out, 
and explains clearly for the first time which industrial capabilities we require to be 
sustained onshore, noting that—as now—there are many that we can continue to 
seek to satisfy through open international competition. (Foreword) 
The DIS makes a concerted effort to outline in a more transparent manner how 
defence procurement decisions are made. It also seeks to assist UK industry in its future 
planning by seeking to be more open on future UK defence acquisition plans. Perhaps most 
important, the DIS puts an emphasis on the need for a change in the relationship between 
government and industry as well as a change in behaviour between the two. As a structural 
mechanism for actually monitoring progress of implementation of the DIS, the National 
Defence Industries Council is tasked to follow the extent of progress, and the DIS is 
reviewed in every defence spending review period.  
The DIS is comprised of three sections. Section A, the “Strategic Overview,” is 
extensive, and provides a thorough analysis of the key overriding factors in UK defence 
policy and acquisition. Section B is a “Review by Industrial Sector and Cross-cutting 
Capabilities.” The extensive assessment of 12 separate sectors and categories is the heart 
of the document, and provides an impressive detailed analysis. Section C concludes with 
discussion on “Implementing the Defence Industrial Strategy.” 
Perhaps the most critical aspect of the DIS is simply the effort undertaken by the 
MOD to seriously analyse and put forth in a coherent structure what is a critical domestic 
defence industrial capability. The 145-page document is an essential first step in generating 
a clear national policy on this critical issue. It assesses the various parameters and aspects 
of UK national defence requirements, determines areas where cooperation with non-UK 
firms carries an acceptable risk and benefit, and candidly recognises those areas where the 
UK cannot maintain a domestic industrial capability at an acceptable cost. The focus on 
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such a detailed analysis in the DIS is borne out by the fact that Section B is roughly half the 
document.  
Certainly the DIS and resulting UK policy seek to protect the defence industry, which 
the MOD has judged to be critical from threats to its viability. But there is no “buy British” 
backdrop to the DIS. To take a larger overview of UK defence acquisition policy, there is a 
UK willingness to enter into multinational arrangements when the need is clear. In 2006, the 
European Defence Agency (EDA) reported that a total of 6.66 billion Euros was spent on 
projects or programs involving two national defence structures, one of which is an EDA 
participating state. The UK was far and away the largest practitioner, with 2.58 billion Euros 
of such collaborative projects, well beyond the 1.63 billion Euros conducted by France 
(EDA, 2006a, p. 22). Of the specific subset of European collaborative procurement that 
year, the total spent by EDA states was 6.07 billion Euros, of which the UK comprised 2.26 
billion Euros (p. 23). Just over 30% of the UK’s total equipment procurement was conducted 
in a collaborative program with another EU member state (p. 24).  
There are key lessons from the DIS exercise and experience which are worth noting. 
One critical point is the fact that this issue received serious attention from senior MOD 
political and uniformed military leadership and led to the Defence Acquisition Change 
Programme which, in turn, introduced Through Life Capability Management and the merging 
of the previously separate Procurement and Support functions. A top-down process was 
critical to instituting a change in culture and attitudes among the MOD personnel working on 
acquisition. That may have been even more critical than the changes in processes and 
structures that were implemented.  
A clear, high-level political imprimatur was essential to generating a cooperative 
attitude from industry, a key outcome worth serious consideration. The UK does much more 
outsourcing of service contracts than other European states. In 2006, the UK comprised 
some 10 billion Euros out of a total reported outsourcing of 14.1 billion Euros (EDA, 2006a, 
p. 21). The UK also has pursued partnering initiatives, a good example of which is the 
establishment of the Complex Weapons initiative (House of Commons Defence Committee, 
2009, p. Ev102), which was part of the DIS. The MOD announced in 2008 that six study 
contracts would be undertaken by Team Complex Weapons, an industry grouping led by 
MBDA (UK), Thales UK, Roxel and QinetiQ, with the MOD as a partner.  
The focus of the Complex Weapons initiative is on missiles and guided weapons. 
The MOD pledged long-term support for key programmes and technology, with industry 
pooling resources and streamlining personnel. The common stated goal was to move from 
bespoke weapons development to flexible, modular weapons design. The six assessment-
phase contracts totalling £74 million were an effort to keep skills in these critical areas within 
the UK, and secure operational sovereignty. The effort is in its early days, and 
commentators (Hewson, 2008), note that a long-term source of steady funding is critical for 
success. But such efforts to establish a cooperative, rather than adversarial, relationship will 
be even more essential for defence and industry as funding becomes ever more difficult to 
obtain. 
To cite some other examples: a Private Finance Initiative is being considered to 
provide the RAF with refuelling tankers for normal operations, with surplus air-transport 
capacity available for lease for civilian use whilst retaining a surge capacity for major 
operations. Similarly, the RAF is considering putting its extra capacity for pilot training to use 
to train pilots for commercial airlines. 
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The MOD has also put the goals and guidelines of the DIS into practice on larger 
acquisition programmes. The block construction of the Type 45 destroyer, the first of which 
was recently unveiled to great public support, is the most high-profile example. The Type 45 
will provide the Royal Navy's primary anti-air warfare capability for over 30 years. And while 
the announced delays in the two planned Future Aircraft Carriers (CVF) tarnishes the 
programme, the cooperative effort with France is an indication of an effective international 
programme, and the work of the Carrier Alliance is a concrete example of a mutually 
beneficial relationship with industry.  
Once again, what is perhaps most noteworthy about the DIS is the fact that the UK 
made the concerted effort to organise its priorities and extensively assess requirements, 
costs and opportunities regarding defence industrial capabilities. Where the decision has 
been made on systems that need to be produced domestically, there is an effort to establish 
a long-term relationship with the suppliers to ensure that capability is maintained. One 
example is the MOD completion of a “Foundation Contract” with BAE Systems in 2007. 
Such arrangements admittedly change, if not eliminate, the requirement for competition, and 
can effectively lock in the status quo. However, the UK decision is the result of a policy 
calculation of what needs to be preserved, rather than an instinctive reaction that because it 
is domestic, a firm must be maintained.  
The UK MOD has been equally rigorous in analysing the down-side of allowing 
defence capabilities to be located off-shore. In a report provided by RAND (Arena et al., 
2005) for the MOD on the UK's naval shipbuilding industrial base, the authors addressed the 
consequences of foreign procurement of naval vessels. Emphasising that its focus was on 
UK shipbuilding capacity, the authors noted that there were several disadvantages. In 
addition to the domestic economic benefit of having ships built in UK shipyards, a foreign 
purchase would generate a concern that the UK would not be able to acquire the latest 
technologies such as advanced sensors. The UK also would run the risk that it would not 
acquire ships that would meet its requirements or leave it open to political pressure to delay 
or even cancel the sale (p. 157-158). 
It is noteworthy that in a subsequent study for the MOD, the RAND researchers 
concluded that the UK would "need to preserve and sustain several key technical skills in 
the maritime domain" in order to "preserve its ability to design, build, and support complex 
warships and submarines" (Pung, et al., 2008, p. xv). The authors focussed in particular on 
the need for "detailed designers and professional engineers involved in various stages of 
surface ship and submarine acquisition and support" (p. xv). Such considerations have 
clearly been taken into account in structuring and concluding various naval programmes, 
such as the Type 45 and the CVF.  
Certainly more needs to be done. In submissions to the House of Commons Defence 
Committee (2009), the Defence Industries Council noted that many steps have been taken 
toward embedding the principles of the DIS into business practice. But the "overall progress 
has been much slower than industry would have wished" (p. 67). The Committee highlighted 
the concern expressed from industry that there is still insufficient transparency about MOD 
plans. In particular, it noted that an updated version of the DIS should have been published 
in December 2007 and has yet to be presented. The Committee criticised the failure to 
publish the updated document, adding that it considers that "its continuing absence 
increases the risk that the UK Defence Industrial Base will not be able to meet the future 
requirements of our Armed Forces" (p. 76).  
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Unfortunately, since Lord Drayson, who as Minister (Defence Equipment and 
Support) was the main driving force behind the DIS, resigned in early 2008, the momentum 
behind the DIS has decreased. Political and economic uncertainty has increased the 
pressure for a Strategic Defence Review in the UK, and it appears unlikely that the next 
edition of the DIS will be published in the near future. There is also concern about whether it 
is possible to generate a follow-on DIS programme that is affordable. As noted above, 
industry now perceive a lack of commitment by the MOD to a sustainable industrial strategy 
and this impression has been reinforced by an ongoing lack of transparency in the MOD’s 
planning activities, despite promises to the contrary. 
The UK approach in the area of a defence industrial strategy is innovative and 
extensive. Like any other country, the UK is concerned about the possibility of being held 
hostage to foreign sources of key military equipment. It is also cognisant of the political 
pressure to protect “British jobs for British workers.” However, to summarise the "lesson 
learned" in this example, the value of the DIS is that it provides a more stable framework in 
which to conduct the policy discussion and reach the programmatic decision. Defence 
establishments that do not undertake such a study are more vulnerable to wide-ranging, ad 
hoc debates which focus on the latest set of unemployment figures, rather than strategic 
military considerations.   
European Defence Cooperation 
Political factors and job preservation are particularly relevant with regard to 
consideration of European defence cooperation, the third area in which UK experience and 
policy provide a number of noteworthy points about the utilisation of flexible, innovative 
approaches. First, as indicated by UK acquisition decisions and endorsed in the DIS, the UK 
is interested in pursuing worthwhile multinational projects. This is driven by the focus on 
capabilities. It is accentuated by the prospects with regard to overall defence spending and 
the need to focus on continuing operations, resulting in an even bleaker picture on available 
acquisition funding. 
However, the second point is that there are limits to UK support for European 
initiatives. The A400M delays and the difficulties which plagued the Typhoon/Eurofighter 
have diminished UK enthusiasm for such efforts. Certainly the UK will be open to hearing 
the case for European projects, and if they are well thought-out and in line with the DIS, will 
be willing to pursue such projects. The agreement with France on the CVF is an indication 
that the UK continues to be ready to conclude arrangements if the programmes meet policy 
goals and the numbers add up. On the other hand, the UK Type 45 destroyer programme 
resulted from a decision to withdraw from a European programme when work-share 
arrangements and misalignment of requirements did not satisfy the UK. Indeed, the Type 45 
programme arose because the UK was not satisfied with two European attempts to 
establish a joint destroyer programme: the NFR-90 and the Horizon CNGF.  
It is clear the UK will be closely monitoring the track record on European military 
programmes and will want to see if such efforts will become more efficient at delivering 
capabilities, rather than just parcelling out jobs and funding. It would appear that European 
states and trans-European organisations are taking steps in the right direction. The question 
is whether they are large enough steps. Many European actions continue to be merely 
restatements of lofty goals, without concrete action. This is exemplified by the November 10, 
2008, declaration of intent among 12 European countries to establish a European Air 
Transport Fleet. This project, taken within the EDA, recognises the importance of a 
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European airlift capability, but does nothing to move the generation of concrete capabilities 
forward. Citing another example, there are constructive initiatives undertaken by the EDA 
and individual states to promote European defence cooperation. The "Guide to the EDA's 
new European Defence Equipment Market" notes that the EDA's "Electronic Bulletin Board” 
provides an opportunity for European firms to bid for defence contracts in virtually all other 
EU member states, and is a small step toward generating a Europe-wide defence 
equipment market (EDA, p. 3).  
The question remains whether increased opportunities to bid will actually generate 
greater willingness for national governments to give contracts to firms from other nations. 
The EDA generated an Intergovernmental Regime in Defence Procurement, which operates 
within Article 296 of the EC Treaty and is aimed at enhancing international competition for 
public procurement. Similarly, the associated Code of Conduct is also aimed at promoting 
more equal treatment of suppliers, promoting transparency. However, the EDA itself makes 
clear that all these steps can only offer an improved approach for changing the way 
Europeans handle defence acquisition, and “It now falls to national governments and 
industry to take full advantage of it" (p. 8).   
As a result, it would appear that the public and political sentiment in the UK would be 
to acquire the last generation of US equipment, rather than the next generation of European 
capabilities. For example, if the clock could be rolled-back, there arguably would be general 
support for acquisition of destroyers with the Aegis system rather than initiating the Type 45 
destroyer project. There are other reasons for preferring acquisition from the US: national 
security policy, the desire to be on the cutting edge of military technology, history, etc. The 
numbers are clearly in favour of military cooperation with the US. The US spends twice as 
much on defence as Europe combined, outspends Europe six to one in defence R&D, and, 
most critically, targets 35% of its defence spending on investment compared to 20% in 
Europe. (EDA, 2006b, para 67). For all of these reasons, there is arguably a strong 
sentiment that cooperative efforts centred on the US may be the optimal way to achieve 
future military capabilities, especially at the high end of the scale. While each European 
state will make its own preferences known in its policy decisions, it would seem from the UK 
perspective that many, if not most, European countries would agree on the need to work 
with the US.  
However, only one state can prevent the US from assuming that essential role in 
military development and acquisition programs: the US. That is arguably the generally 
accepted UK view. And from a UK vantage point, it may well be the general European 
perception. While the JSF, which has a particular significance for the UK, will be addressed 
later, it is important at this point to address the ramifications of the action by the US 
Congress in 2008 to overturn the DoD decision to award the aerial tanker contract to the 
Northrup-Grumman/EADS proposal for the KC-30 tanker. Simply put, this decision has 
damaged the European desire to work with the US in the area of defence acquisition. 
To provide a short history: EADS had made no secret of its desire to enter the US 
market, and the DoD requirement to find a new aerial tanker to replace the KC-45 provided 
a unique opportunity which EADS ardently pursued. Boeing was the only obvious source for 
the new tanker, and there were no viable competitors. Indeed, Congress itself recognised 
and made clear its views on the importance of ensuring there was a competition. EADS then 
made extra efforts to acquire the political support it would need. It partnered with Northrup-
Grumman on the tanker proposal, emphasised the KC-30 would be an American tanker, and 
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proposed to maximise US domestic content by having the Airbus A330 airframe produced in 
the US.  
The Air Force decision of February 29, 2008, to award the contract to the Northrup-
Grumman/EADS consortium could well have marked a critical juncture in the promotion of 
multinational defence acquisition. From the UK perspective, the stereotypes of the way the 
US and Europe view each other with regard to defence acquisition carries a great deal of 
truth. The US believes it has the best military technology and Europe is pursuing 
protectionist policies which focus on jobs and money rather than military capabilities. In an 
“objective” competition, Europe would buy US equipment and get more value for money. For 
Europeans, there is a policy concern about becoming reliant on US military equipment and a 
political focus on European jobs. European defence industry believes it has the technology 
and capability to contribute to a modern military program. But as the prognosis for European 
defence spending is bleak, it wants an opportunity to enter the US market, since that is 
where the money can be found. In this respect, BAE System’s approach has been to re-
invent itself as a global company with wholly owned US subsidiaries who are able to market 
themselves in the USA as US companies under the BAE Systems, Inc., banner. 
The decision in favour of Northrup-Grumman/EADS was quickly met with a protest 
by Boeing, loudly supported by members of Congress, and was subsequently sustained by 
the Government Accountability Office [GAO] (2008b) in its June 18, 2008, decision. The 
GAO cited seven reasons for sustaining the Boeing protest, all of which focussed on 
shortcomings in the Air Force selection process, and recommended the competition be 
conducted again.  
It might be fair to state that the GAO decision has not been widely read by 
Europeans and that they only know that the GAO is an arm of the Congress. More 
important, the perception is that procedural flaws only became material when a "foreign" 
consortium won the competition. Such a perception can have an impact on defence 
industrial cooperation. First, it casts doubt on the US willingness to engage in an “objective” 
competition assessing cost and capabilities. Second, it validates the views of some that 
even if European firms partner with US defence contractors, they will still not be able to 
enter the US market. Third, the Congressional impetus for the re-opening the decision 
provides validation for those who argue that the US also will act to preserve its sovereign 
military capabilities as well as American jobs, so there is no reason for Europe to bow to US 
criticism on this count.  
Finally, the re-opening of the decision damages the goal of promoting competition, 
emphasised by Congress itself. There was no competitor to Boeing for the next generation 
of tankers, and it was Congress which pressed for a competition. A situation with no 
competing US firms may become increasingly common in the future, and in a situation in 
which there are few bidders, they have power due to the threat to not participate in the 
bidding process (Franck, Lewis & Udis, 2008, September 30, p. 36). In view of the outcome 
of the tanker decision, European firms will be reluctant to pursue the time and expense of 
trying to provide a competitive bid which it will not be allowed to win.  
The history of the aerial tanker decision has damaged the European perception of 
the opportunities to cooperate with US firms and enter the US market. It has also 
strengthened the case for European defence cooperation, particularly in areas where 
programs cannot be funded by individual defence budgets. As stated previously, the UK 
believes that there are many reasons to support cooperative military programs centred on 
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the US as the optimal path for increasingly expensive investments in defence programs. 
Discussion of UK support for such efforts leads to the program which currently has the 
greatest impact on views of US-led development projects: the JSF program.  
Joint Strike Fighter 
The fourth and final example which is valuable to analyse is the JSF, the largest 
multinational development program in history and a prime example of the UK commitment to 
pursuing innovative approaches to defence acquisition. It is a high-profile project which has 
numerous aspects, each of which could justify an entire discussion. There is, however, one 
key aspect which needs to be highlighted, particularly in a US forum: the impact of US 
technology transfer rules on future multinational military development programs.  
This is not simply the litany of long-standing complaints about US technology transfer 
rules and the International Trafficking in Arms Regulations (ITAR). The high-profile US-UK 
dispute over JSF source codes, which needed to be resolved at the level of President and 
Prime Minister, is merely the most notable case of the difficulties faced by US partners in 
such endeavours. Simply put, the application of US technology transfer rules as exemplified 
in the JSF damages the prospects for multinational military development programs centred 
on the US If that is the perception from arguably the closest US ally, one which is committed 
to cooperative programs with the US whenever possible, that is an indication of the 
seriousness of the threat posed by US regulations and practice to the future of US-led 
programs. 
It is important to begin with a short history of the program to indicate why the JSF is 
such a significant commitment (if not a gamble) by the UK. In the 1990s, the US Navy, 
Marine Corps and Air Force were working on a next-generation strike aircraft. In 1996, the 
JSF project was announced by the US At about the same time, the British Royal Navy was 
also looking at new Future Carrier Borne Aircraft capability for its CVF programme. The US 
and UK combined efforts in this area. The requirements of the US services drove the 
program, but the UK focus was on an attack aircraft with advanced Short Takeoff and 
Vertical Landing (STOVL) capabilities so that it could operate from forward battlefields as 
well as from aircraft carriers. The UK preference for the JSF was confirmed in a 2001 MOU 
with the US In 2002, the UK selected the STOVL variant to meet its future requirements, 
with a positive review of the JSF program and the STOVL design completed in 2005 (NAO, 
2008b, p. 45). 
It was important that as an indication of US support for this endeavour, the Office of 
the Secretary of Defence sent down instructions that the JSF program should emphasise 
international participation, and there was a consensus that the UK would participate in the 
program (Franck, Lewis & Udis, 2008, January 29). The US and UK engaged in extensive, 
detailed exchanges on the nature of the program and the UK role, compiled in the US-UK 
Engineering and Manufacturing Development Framework MOU. Comprised of agreements, 
letters and other supporting material, it provides the details of the US-UK relationship on 
JSF.  
While decisions on specific numbers of fighters to be purchased were not required at 
the outset, the Royal Navy and Air Force were looking at the purchase of some 150 STOVL 
fighters to replace the Harriers. The UK participation began at the outset of the program, 
and the UK is the only "Level 1" partner contributing some $2 billion to the system design 
and development phase (Bolkcom, 2009). That designation means that the UK has 
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significant access to most aspects of the program as well as the ability to influence 
requirements and design solutions. And the UK will not have to pay the non-recurring R&D 
cost recoupment charge that normally accompanies the purchase of US military equipment 
and will receive a share of the levies on sales to third parties.   
However, the UK commitment to the JSF is not primarily based on programmatic 
considerations such as cost savings, but on a key national security determination. The UK 
made a policy decision on the need to retain an aircraft carrier capability, and the 
requirement for carrier-based fighters derived from that critical decision. The recent 
announcement by the Defence Minister of a postponement of the aircraft carrier production 
schedule by another two years due to constraints on the defence budget is obviously critical 
for that specific programme. The delays mean that the two carriers now have projected in-
service dates of 2015/16 and 2016/17. However, that decision on the carriers is separate 
from the discussions on the JSF fighters that will operate on those carriers. 
There is no doubt that the UK has made a significant wager in tying itself to the JSF 
program, for if there are major problems with the fighter, the UK will need to generate a 
"Plan B" to avoid having its aircraft carriers merely serving as floating platforms. If the 
STOVL version of the JSF does not emerge, the UK would be faced with the challenge of 
re-designing ships so that, for example, they would have new catapults. As of April 2007, 
the UK plan had been to bring in a total of 138 JSF fighters, with the bulk of the acquisition 
to begin starting in calendar year 2012 (Joint Strike Fighter Program Office, 2007). The 
MOD is already in the process of working through modelling and simulation to optimise the 
safety and operability of the new aircraft carriers and the JSF when the fighters arrive (Scott, 
2009).  
The delays and cost increases associated with the Eurofighter program were a factor 
in the UK consideration of participation in the JSF. In the aftermath of the Eurofighter 
experience, the fact that the JSF was structured so that the most competitive firms would 
win contracts was appealing to the UK, and in line with the goal of pursuing more efficient 
acquisition programs. And the fact that the US was providing the overwhelming amount of 
funding for a program with cutting-edge military technology was significant to all the 
participating states, including the UK. 
Adding to the list of factors pressing the UK to participate in JSF, the Defence 
Industrial Strategy places great emphasis on the need for the UK to remain interoperable 
with Allies, particularly the US It is also noteworthy that British industrial participation 
amplifies the UK focus on the JSF project. BAE Systems is the largest non-American 
participant in the JSF and has hoped for around £14 billion in development and production 
contracts (McGhie & Gee, 2006). Such a high level of BAE participation is to be expected, 
as it does the majority of its business in the US and is one of the largest suppliers to DoD. It 
is also noteworthy that BAE participation in the JSF was viewed in the UK as a seal of 
approval on the British ability to participate in cutting-edge military projects. Trade and 
Industry Secretary Patricia Hewitt said that BAE participation “proves that British companies 
can compete with the best in the world for the big contracts” (”Jet contract,” 2001). And there 
are potentially significant economic benefits. A Congressional Research Service (2009, p. 
17) study notes that the DoD conducted a 2003 assessment which determined that partner 
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As the technology transfer issue came to dominate the discussions on the JSF, it is 
also important to note the backdrop for US-UK military cooperation. Franck, Lewis & Udis 
(2008, January 29) note that it is estimated that 99.8% of licenses for UK-US transactions 
are approved, which accounts for some 8,500 items with a value of $14 billion, indicating 
that the routine operation of bilateral defence cooperation and technology transfer proceeds 
without friction. Moreover, the extent of UK-US defence industrial interconnection has 
increased substantially. Aside from BAE, UK firms have acquired 50 aerospace and defence 
firms in the US since 2001, which constitutes some three-quarters of all foreign investment 
in the US defence sector (p. 20-21). Major American defence contractors are established in 
the UK or have acquired operations or set up a presence in the UK.  
With this backdrop of increasing cooperation, the specific problems that arose 
regarding access to JSF source codes generated doubts in the UK regarding US-led military 
cooperative efforts that could have been avoided. Initially, commentary on the JSF was full 
of praise as a model for future multinational defence cooperation. That turned to criticism of 
the JSF as an example of why such efforts may not pass an all-encompassing cost-benefit 
analysis.  
It is a key operational requirements as well as a matter of sovereignty for the UK to 
be able to have the information needed to integrate, upgrade, operate and sustain the JSF 
as required. As a practical matter, the UK cannot buy into a system which requires a US 
maintenance team to take care of any problems that may arise or to arrange for required 
modifications. The House of Commons Defence Committee (2005) reported that:  
It is vital that the UK gets all the information and access to technology it requires 
from the U.S. to have 'Sovereign Capability'—the ability to maintain the Joint Strike 
Fighter aircraft and undertake future upgrades independently. The UK must receive 
adequate assurances that it will get all the information and access to technology it 
requires before the programme is too far advanced. If these assurances are not 
given, it is questionable whether the UK should continue its involvement in the 
programme. (p. 3) 
The Committee (2005, p. 29) emphasised that the UK could not accept a situation in 
which it could not operate the JSF independently of the US and pressed the Defence 
Minister to act to ensure the UK would have operational independence. It noted its 
expectation that the MOD would set a deadline by which the assurances on sovereign 
capability would be obtained from the US In December 2006, as the source code issue was 
heating up, the Committee warned that an assurance from the US was needed by the end of 
the year that it would provide the UK with all the requested technical information. In the 
absence of such an agreement by the end of 2006, the committee called on the government 
to develop a “plan B” to obtain alternative aircraft (”MPs warn,” 2006).  
From the UK perspective, the history of the political discussions to resolve the source 
code issue is not the best advertisement for multinational programs. Indeed, the fact that 
such issues never seemed to be fully resolved added to the frustration with US policy and 
practice. The technology transfer dispute had already been addressed in 2004, when 
Secretary of State for Defence Hoon wrote to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld on the issue 
and referred to the fact that the US had signed an outline agreement on defence technology 
cooperation in 2002 (O'Connell, 2004). It is noteworthy that PM Blair believed he had 
reached an agreement with President Bush in May 2006, but, however, the dispute lingered 
on unresolved until the end of the year (Baldwin, 2006). Indeed, in the Defence 
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Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Congress, aware of UK concerns over this issue, 
advised the Secretary of Defence to share technology consistent with the national security 
interests of the US and UK (Bolkcom, 2009, p. 18).  
The importance of technology transfer in cooperative arrangements with the US was 
already set out in the DIS, where the significance of the US defence market and US defence 
spending was acknowledged. The DIS observation on the technology transfer point warrants 
a full recitation: 
To meet our own sovereign needs, it is important that we continue to have the 
autonomous capability to operate, support and where necessary adapt the 
equipment that we procure. Appropriate technology transfer is therefore of crucial 
importance. This is so for any cooperative project, but in practice difficulties have 
arisen particularly with the U.S., whose technology disclosure policy we have found 
less adapted to the needs of cooperative procurement than those of our partners in 
Europe. To reiterate, this is not about gaining competitive advantage for UK industry; 
it is about being confident that the equipment we buy meets the capability 
requirements against which it is procured and can be modified effectively to meet 
emerging requirements through life. We fully recognise the need to ensure that 
intellectual property is protected, and that appropriate measures are put in place to 
ensure this; security is a key issue for us, just as it is for the USA. But a certain 
degree of technology transfer is required if we are to be able to fully cooperate with 
the USA (or any other partner) on our equipment programmes. What we are striving 
towards is an agreed framework which facilitates this whilst ensuring that our mutual 
security needs are met. (MOD, 2005, December, p. 45) 
Difficulties with US practice arise even when it is not the most sensitive technology. 
One Lockheed-Martin employee noted that the restrictions on technology transfer have been 
“far more cumbersome and impenetrable than originally envisioned” and that it is necessary 
to ask for Washington’s approval of “even unclassified information exchanges” (Metz, 2005, 
p. KN3-7). Such requirements make it difficult for partners to participate, and generates a 
large administrative burden on the team members, who face the requirement that “all 
information is releasable under penalty of jail terms—not a conducive atmosphere for co-
engineering a product” (p. KN3-7).  
It is worth noting that the report of the Inspector General (IG) of the Department of 
Defense (2008) on security controls regarding JSF classified technology assessed seven 
applications from Northrup Grumman and BAE systems for detailed review. In addition, the 
IG's office evaluated security reports on BAE Systems facilities. While the assessment from 
the IG's office was a frank statement that JSF advanced technology "may have been 
compromised by unauthorized access at facilities and in computers at BAE Systems" (p. ii), 
the specific criticism was that DoD did not always use sufficient controls to evaluate potential 
unauthorised access to such technology (p. i). Indeed, the specific recommendation with 
regard to BAE Systems is that the Defence Security Service (DSS) could have bolstered its 
efforts by collecting, analysing and retaining security audit reports completed by BAE 
Systems, a point on which the Director of DSS concurred. The other recommendations 
involved the actions of DSS. 
Now that the source code issue has been resolved, the JSF is once again a low-
profile project. The House of Commons Defence Committee (2009) simply noted that the 
MOD has assessed that the JSF program is "progressing well" and the Committee would 
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monitor the progress of the program (p. 47). Secretary of State for Defence Hutton 
announced in March 2009 that the UK would purchase three F-35B operational test aircraft, 
indicating the UK commitment to the Operational Test and Evaluation phase of the JSF 
(JSF, 2009).  
Unfortunately, that does not erase the contentious history. If the JSF is an example 
of the future of multinational military cooperative programs, the source code dispute has 
clouded the picture. In late 2006, with the issue of source codes at its most contentious, an 
unnamed UK MOD official was quoted as stating, “If we can’t trust the Americans to provide 
this, then you would have to ask what else we should be doing with them in defence terms” 
(Baldwin, 2006).  
It is unfortunate that the US-UK Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty, signed in 2007, 
is still on hold. In September 2008, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee deferred a 
decision on ratification of the defence trade treaties with the UK and Australia until 2009 due 
to "too many unresolved questions" about both treaties (Wagstaff-Smith, 2009). The goal of 
the treaty, to cut red tape in the bilateral exchange of defence goods services and 
information, would have been a productive step forward. 
On the other hand, such complaints about US policy are long-standing, and it is not 
clear how heavily they will weigh on the decisions of other nations to work with the US on 
military projects. As Franck, Lewis and Udis (2008, January 29) point out, “very few national 
military establishments can generate sufficient orders to sustain a weapons source of 
efficient size in any category” (p. 17). And with the rapid growth of military technology (and 
the concomitant growth of costs) the essential nature of the US in any development program 
will clearly increase.  
However, the US should consider whether it can afford to be indifferent to the 
willingness of other nations to participate in, and carry some of the costs of, such defence 
programs. Spreading the burden of large development costs would presumably be 
appealing to the DoD. Increasing costs also have ramifications with regard to the production 
phase of future programs. It is an open question whether DoD contracts alone would be 
sufficient to sustain US military contractors.  
The Congressional Research Service has noted that while the US aviation industry is 
positioned to compete in the growing global market for civil aircraft, "the extent to which 
such economic conditions may preserve an adequate US defence industrial base for the 
development and production of combat aircraft is debatable, however, given the significant 
differences between civilian and military aircraft requirements and technologies" (Bolkcom, 
2009, p. 17). Even US firms and the DoD may need to focus more on overseas sales to 
sustain programs. And if the US wishes to generate significant sales to other nations, then it 
is important that such equipment address the fundamental issues of operational 
requirements and sovereignty which have been critical to the UK in the JSF.  
If the JSF experience is an indication of wider structural problems, it suggests that 
multinational military development programs may be too difficult to be politically or 
economically feasible. Technology transfer issues may generate too much friction. Difficult 
decisions on the awarding of contracts may be too hard to overcome. Increased costs may 
not be sufficient to counter-balance political and programmatic challenges. The extent of the 
obstacles to multinational projects should be more thoroughly researched and analysed. 
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If these problems are indeed too difficult to overcome to allow for efficient 
multinational development programs, then perhaps the better option might be for 
multinational acquisition programs. In such arrangements, there would be fewer states 
participating in development and more states signing up for purchase of the equipment. This 
could reduce the impact of some of the more contentious issues while increasing 
interoperability. However, there would still be significant difficulties, especially political 
problems, and technology transfer problems would only be reduced, but not eliminated. 
Once again, it would be important to more thoroughly research and analyse the potential 
benefits of greater multinational acquisition programs. If the structure of such arrangements 
allows for more efficiency in development and production, and addresses the concerns of 
individual military establishments, it might be a more cost-effective option. 
Conclusion 
To return to a central theme of this paper, it appears to the UK that scarcer 
resources and increasingly expensive military projects make it imperative to look closely at 
innovative approaches to defence acquisition. While new theories should be welcomed and 
encouraged, it is far less speculative to study the concrete "lessons learned" from the 
practice of other defence establishments. The goal of examining these four critical areas of 
UK defence acquisition was not to indicate that the UK has a formula or solution. Instead, it 
was to highlight new approaches to new challenges and the results of some innovative 
practices.  
The C-17 decision indicates the benefits that can be obtained by focussing on 
capabilities. The UK Defence Industrial Strategy shows the value of a serious assessment of 
which domestic military capabilities are essential. The UK view of European defence 
cooperation theory and practice provides a sobering assessment of its shortcomings. And 
the UK experience with the JSF indicates the extent of the difficulties generated by US 
technology transfer and export control policies to promoting military development programs 
led by the US.  
The expectation is that commentators will have other views on these UK examples. 
From the UK perspective, that is the point: close scrutiny and analysis of practice in other 
nations is an important exercise for any defence force, particularly in these financially 
challenging times. It would be valuable to intensify research on the comparative policies and 
practices of various defence establishments. And it would be instructive to bear in mind the 
approach taken by the defence industry: increasingly ignoring national boundaries, and 
working to ensure that they can operate and transfer expertise across boundaries.  
At a time when defence budgets are under pressure and the use of the word "crisis" 
may not be an overstatement, it is important for military establishments to reassess how 
they are conducting defence acquisition and to consider new and innovative ways of doing 
business. In short, there is no more appropriate time to intensively research and analyse the 






==================aÉÑÉåëÉ=~Åèìáëáíáçå=áå=íê~åëáíáçå======== - 241 - 
=
=
List of References 
Arena, M., Pung, H., Cook, C., Marquis, J., Riposo, J. & Lee, G. (2005). The United Kingdom's naval 
shipbuilding industrial base—The next fifteen years. Santa Monica, California: RAND, pp. 
157-158. . Retrieved December 2, 2008, from http://www.rand.org 
Baldwin, T. (2006, December 11). Secret codes clash may sink £140 billion fighter deal. The Times. 
Retrieved December 2, 2008, from http://www.timesonline.co.uk 
Jet contract ‘to create 8,500 jobs.’ (2001, October 26). BBC News. Retrieved December 2, 2008, from 
http://news.bbc.co.uk  
MPs warn over US fighter jet deal. (2006, December 8). BBC News. Retrieved December 2, 2008, 
from http://news.bbc.co.uk/  
Birkler, J., Schank, J., Arena, M., Smith, G., & Lee, G. (2002). The Royal Navy's new generation type-
45 destroyer: Acquisition options and implications (MR-1486-MOD). Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND. Retrieved February 11, 2009, from http://www.rand.org/ 
Bolkcom, C. (2009). F35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program: Background, status, and 
issues (7-5700 RL 30563). Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, pp. 18-18. 
Capital Journal. (2008, November 21). In crisis, opportunity for Obama. Wall Street Journal. Retrieved 
February 16, 2009, from http://online.wsj.com/  
European Defence Agency. (2006a). 2006 national breakdowns of European defence expenditure, 
pp. 21-24. Retrieved December 2, 2008, from http:///www.eda.europe.eu/ 
European Defence Agency. (2006b). An initial long-term vision for European defence capability and 
capacity needs, Para 67. Retrieved December 2, 2008 from http://www.eda.europe.eu. 
European Defence Agency. (2008). A guide to the EDA's new European defence equipment market, 
preface on Pages 3, 8. Retrieved December 2, 2008 from http://www.eda.europe.eu. 
Franck, C., Lewis, I., & Udis, B. (2008, September 30). New patterns of collaboration and rivalry in the 
U.S. and European defense and aerospace industries (NPS-AM-08-131). (p. 36). Monterey, 
CA: Naval Postgraduate School. 
Franck, C., Lewis, I., & Udis, B. (2008, January 29; 2008, May 20). Echoes across the pond: 
Understanding EU-US defence industrial relationships (NPS-AM-08-002). Monterey, CA: 
Naval Postgraduate School, pp. 17, 64, 88, 98. 
GAO. (2008, December). Improved analysis and cost data needed to evaluate the cost-effectiveness 
of performance based logistics (GAO-09-41). Washington, DC: Author. 
GAO. (2008, June 18). Decision in matter of the Boeing company (File: B-311344, et al.). 
Washington, DC: Author.  
Hewson, R. (2008, September 4). Opinion: UK faces complex questions in bid to supply critical future 
weapon systems. Jane's. Retrieved March 3, 2009, from http://search.janes.com/  
Hollinger, P. & Pfeifer, S. (2009, March 31). EADS reassures customers over future of A400M. The 
Financial Times. Retrieved April 2, 2009, from http://www.ft.com  
House of Commons Defence Committee. (2005, December 21). Future carrier and joint combat 
aircraft programmes. Second Report of Session 2005-06. HC 554, p. 3. London: The 
Stationary Office Limited.  
House of Commons Defence Committee. (2007, July 5). Strategic lift. HC 462, Para. 62. London: The 
Stationary Office Limited.  
House of Commons Defence Committee. (2007, October 12). Strategic lift: Government response to 
the Committee's eleventh report of session 2006-2007. HC 1025, Para. 12. London: The 
Stationary Office Limited. 
 =
=
==================aÉÑÉåëÉ=~Åèìáëáíáçå=áå=íê~åëáíáçå======== - 242 - 
=
=
House of Commons Defence Committee. (2009, February 26). Defence equipment 2009. Third 
Report of Session 2008-2009. HC 107, pp. 3, 47, 67, EV 102. London: The Stationary Office 
Limited.  
Inspector General. US DoD. (2008, March 6). Security controls over Joint Strike Fighter classified 
technology (Report No. D-2008-058). Washington, DC: Author, p. ii.   
Joint Strike Fighter Program Office. (2007). Annex A (April 2007 revision) estimated JSF air vehicle 
procurement quantities. Retrieved December 2, 2008, from 
http://www.jsf.mil/downloads/down_documentation.htm 
Joint Strike Fighter Program Office. (2009, March 19). United Kingdom announces F-35 Joint Strike 
Fighter purchase. Retrieved April 3, 2009, from http://www.jsf.mil/.  
Kincaid, B. (2008). Changing the dinosaur's spots—The battle to reform UK defence acquisition. 
London: RUSI.  
Kotter, J. (1995, March-April). Leading change: Why transformation efforts fail. Harvard Business 
Review, 59-67. 
McGhie, T., & Gee, J. (2006, February 26). Anglo-US defence deals in jeopardy. Financial Mail, 1. 
Metz, P. (2005). The Joint Strike Fighter—An international enterprise. In Flight Test—Sharing 
knowledge and experience (pp. KN-3-1 -- KN3-8). Meeting Proceedings (RTO-MP-SCI-162, 
Paper KN3). Retrieved from http://www.rto.nato.int/abstracts.asp/ 
MOD. (2005, December). Defence industrial strategy (Defence White Paper CM6697). London: 
Author, p. 45. 
National Audit Office. (2008a, December 18). Ministry of Defence major projects report 2008. HC 64-
1 Session 2008-2009,.p. 5. London: Author.  
National Audit Office. (2008b, December 18). Ministry of Defence major projects report 2008: Project 
summary sheets. HC 64-II. Session 2008-2009, pp. 8, 45. London: Author.  
NATO. (2009, February 5). NATO and OCCAR sign agreement on security of information. Retrieved 
February 11, 2009, from http://www.nato.int/docu/  
OCCAR. (2008). OCCAR business plan 2008. Retrieved December 2, 2008, from www.occar-ea.org.  
O’Connell, D. (2004, July 25). Britain fights for larger stake in JSF. The Times. Retrieved December 
2, 2008, from http://business.timesonline.co.uk/  
Pung, H., Smallman, L., Arena, M, Kallimani, J., Lee, G., Puri, S. & Schank, J. (2008) Sustaining key 
skills in the UK naval industry. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, p. xv. Retrieved December 2, 2008, 
from www.rand.org.  
RAND Corporation. (2005). The United Kingdom's nuclear submarine industrial base. (Vols. 1, 2 and 
3; MG-326/1-MOD, MG-326/2-MOD and MG-326/3-MOD). Santa Monica, CA: Author. 
Retrieved February 11, 2009, from http://www.rand.org/ 
Schank, J. (2006, April 6). Trends in the United Kingdom's naval shipbuilding industrial base—
Lessons for the United States(CT-259). Testimony presented before the Senate Armed 
Services Committee, Subcommittee on Seapower. Santa Monica, CA: RAND. Retrieved 
February 11, 2009, from http://www.rand.org/ 
Scott, R. (2009, January). Preparing for take-off: UK ramps up JSF carrier integration effort. Jane’s 
International Defence Review, 44-49. 
Wagstaff-Smith, K. (2009, February 11). 'Buy America' plan raises fears for trade treaty. Jane's 
Defence Weekly, 31. 
 =
=




















2003 - 2009 Sponsored Research Topics 
Acquisition Management 
 Acquiring Combat Capability via Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) 
 BCA: Contractor vs. Organic Growth 
 Defense Industry Consolidation 
 EU-US Defense Industrial Relationships 
 Knowledge Value Added (KVA) + Real Options (RO) Applied to Shipyard 
Planning Processes  
 Managing Services Supply Chain 
 MOSA Contracting Implications 
 Portfolio Optimization via KVA + RO 
 Private Military Sector 
 Software Requirements for OA 
 Spiral Development 
 Strategy for Defense Acquisition Research 
 The Software, Hardware Asset Reuse Enterprise (SHARE) repository 
Contract Management 
 Commodity Sourcing Strategies 
 Contracting Government Procurement Functions 
 Contractors in 21st Century Combat Zone 
 Joint Contingency Contracting 
 Model for Optimizing Contingency Contracting Planning and Execution 
 Navy Contract Writing Guide 
 Past Performance in Source Selection 
 Strategic Contingency Contracting 
 Transforming DoD Contract Closeout 
 USAF Energy Savings Performance Contracts 
 USAF IT Commodity Council 
 USMC Contingency Contracting 
Financial Management 
 Acquisitions via leasing: MPS case 
 Budget Scoring 
 Budgeting for Capabilities-based Planning 





 Energy Saving Contracts/DoD Mobile Assets 
 Financing DoD Budget via PPPs 
 Lessons from Private Sector Capital Budgeting for DoD Acquisition Budgeting 
Reform 
 PPPs and Government Financing 
 ROI of Information Warfare Systems 
 Special Termination Liability in MDAPs 
 Strategic Sourcing 
 Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) to Improve Cost Estimates 
Human Resources 
 Indefinite Reenlistment 
 Individual Augmentation 
 Learning Management Systems 
 Moral Conduct Waivers and First-tem Attrition 
 Retention 
 The Navy’s Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) Management System 
 Tuition Assistance 
Logistics Management 
 Analysis of LAV Depot Maintenance 
 Army LOG MOD 
 ASDS Product Support Analysis 
 Cold-chain Logistics 
 Contractors Supporting Military Operations 
 Diffusion/Variability on Vendor Performance Evaluation 
 Evolutionary Acquisition 
 Lean Six Sigma to Reduce Costs and Improve Readiness 
 Naval Aviation Maintenance and Process Improvement (2) 
 Optimizing CIWS Lifecycle Support (LCS) 
 Outsourcing the Pearl Harbor MK-48 Intermediate Maintenance Activity  
 Pallet Management System 
 PBL (4) 
 Privatization-NOSL/NAWCI 
 RFID (6) 
 Risk Analysis for Performance-based Logistics 





 Sense-and-Respond Logistics Network 
 Strategic Sourcing 
Program Management 
 Building Collaborative Capacity 
 Business Process Reengineering (BPR) for LCS Mission Module Acquisition 
 Collaborative IT Tools Leveraging Competence 
 Contractor vs. Organic Support 
 Knowledge, Responsibilities and Decision Rights in MDAPs 
 KVA Applied to Aegis and SSDS 
 Managing the Service Supply Chain 
 Measuring Uncertainty in Earned Value 
 Organizational Modeling and Simulation 
 Public-Private Partnership 
 Terminating Your Own Program 
 Utilizing Collaborative and Three-dimensional Imaging Technology 
 
A complete listing and electronic copies of published research are available on our website: 




















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK     









www.acquisitionresearch.org   
